The Civil war:
Background
After years as an Italian colony, Somalia gained its independence in 1960.
Siad Barre assumed control of the country in a dictatorship. Aideed spent
the late 1960's and early 1970's in prison for planning a coup against
Barre. Barre eventually freed Aideed and made him ambassador to India,
Sri Lanka and Singapore. Aideed helped form the United Somali Congress
(USC) which deposed Barre. Ali Mahdi proclaimed himself USC President
of the Republic of Somalia. Civil War Begins In June 1991, Aideed was
elected chairman of the United Somali Congress by a two-thirds vote, but
Ali Mahdi refused to step down as President. By October 1991, Ali Mahdi
had formed a government of eight ministers, and the Italian government
promised massive financial support. Aideed declared his faction of the
USC to be the legitimate government of Somalia, and Ali Mahdi declared
war on Aideed. Aideed's militia forces quickly defeated Mahdi's, confining
Mahdi's supporters to a small area of Somalia's capital, Mogadishu. Aideed
could have captured the remainder of Mahdi's territory, but refrained,
instead concentrating his efforts on expelling what remained of Siad Barre's
army in southern Somalia. The robbery of Barre's army was mainly responsible
for the famine in that region. The main difference between Aideed's faction
and Mahdi's is that Mahdi supports an Italian-style democracy while Aideed
favors the traditional tribal form of government known as kritarchy. Various
Somali clans sided with Aideed. On March 30, 1993, the four tribes of
northwest Somalia adopted the traditional Somali constitution, the Xeer
(pronounced "hair"). On June 4, two more clans from northeast and center
Somalia adopted the Xeer. Violence decreased as the clans adopted a peaceful
government.
The U.N. intervenes:
The U.N. opened an office in Mogadishu a few months after Aideed routed Mahdi's forces. U.N. Representative Mohamed Sahnoun realized he was too late to mediate between the two factions, and concentrated on reducing the famine in southern Somalia. The U.N. Secretary General wanted a more visible role and fired Sahnoun. Sahnoun's successors declared Somalia an anarchy, Aideed a bandit, and firearms the problem. The U.N. then embarked on a military occupation of Somalia and a full disarmament of its population. The U.N. decried Somalia's lack of ability to govern itself, not mentioning that only foreign subsidy was able to keep dictator Siad Barre in power, and that foreign governments rejected the Somali majority's choice of government (Aideed's) in favor of someone who would do their bidding (Mahdi). Somalia is perfectly capable of governing itself when foreigners keep their noses in their own business. The U.N.'s expensive campaign resulted in more violence, as the Somali tribes fought to preserve their right to keep and bear arms. On June 5, 1993, U.N. troops attempted to shut down Somali militia leader Mohamed Farah Aideed's radio station because it was broadcasting "propaganda" (that is, anti-U.N. messages). In a victory for free speech, Somali militiamen repelled the attack, killing 24 Pakistani troops. The Somalis' successful repulse of the U.N. attack led the United States to begin an expensive, bloody, five-month manhunt for Aideed. Dozens of U.S. and U.N. troops, and hundreds of Somalis, were killed. In October 1993, the U.S. ended the search after eighteen U.S. soldiers were killed andsome of their corpses dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. During the weeks from June 5 to October 3, 1993, U.N/U.S. forces inflicted 6,000 to 10,000 casualties on the Somali resistance, said Eric Schmitt in the the December 8, 1993 New York Times. Schmitt confirmed the account with U.S. military intelligence, relief workers, U.N. officials and the U.S. special envoy to Somalia. U.S. Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni estimated that two-thirds of the casualties were women and children. Only a small fraction of the money spent by the U.N. on "relief efforts" -- the equivalent of hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars -- actually benefited Somalis.
Somalia after the UN: In March 1994, U.S. and other Western troops withdrew from Somalia, and by March 1995 the remaining African and Asian U.N. troops withdrew. The News and Observer reported, "The city has been generally quieter since U.N. forces left in early March, although there is sporadic factional fighting." In June 1995, the United Somali Congress - Somali National Alliance (USC-SNA) called a Congress, at which Aideed was ousted as chairman, and replaced by former ally Osman Hassan Ali Atto. Atto called for a return of U.N. troops to help "rebuild" Somalia. Aideed refused to recognize the congress, believing it to be foreign-manipulated. Aideed's supporters elected him president of Somalia. In September 1995, in a m
ajor military move, Aideed and six hundred militiamen siezed the southern Somali city of Baidoa. Some groups reported heavy fighting and much looting, while travellers from Baidoa said the takeover involved little bloodshed. Fighting in the capital city of Mogadishu erupted again in October 1995 as Ali Mahdi's supporters fired at a banana ship to keep it from docking. Somalia's banana export industry is tied to Aideed, and Ali Mahdi has banned banana ships from Mogadishu's port.
On Militias and standing Armee: Of particular interest in the failed U.N. occupation of Somalia is that the Somalis successfully repulsed the great modern armies of Western civilization. Somali soldiers are militiamen. They are unpaid
volunteers who fight not on orders, but out of desire to defend their communities. Obviously, the Somalis did not win by military superiority, but they successfully demonstrated that military superiority is not necessary to win a conflict. Critics of the right to keep and bear arms often deride the notion that untrained individuals with small arms could stand a chance against a well-equipped modern army. Supporters of a large defense budget often claim that a high-tech military is the only possible way to defend a country in today's world. They are both wrong, as Somalia has so clearly proved. A well-organized citizen militia, protected by the right to keep and bear arms, is still the most effective protection for the security of a free state.